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REFORMING CORRUPTION OR CORRUPTING 
REFORM?  WADING THROUGH THE MURK OF 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM 
Dennis J. Ciancio† 
Battling Corruption in America’s Public Schools.  By Lydia G. Segal. 
Harvard University Press, 2005.  257 pages.  $16.95.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Lydia Segal lures her reader into the shady inner dwellings of 
political corruption, the seedy patronage of corporate power 
brokers, and morbid tales of bribery, greed, governmental 
investigations, and massive systemic waste.  Lamentably, she is not 
exposing some mob-like organization but instead the corruption 
and waste that suffocates the mission of what should be the nation’s 
most trusted institutions, its public schools.  In Battling Corruption in 
America’s Public Schools, Segal encapsulates the plight of the three 
largest school districts in the United States—New York, Los 
Angeles, and Chicago—and challenges educational reformers to 
reconsider the reform movements already demonstrated to be 
ineffective in these districts.  Segal provides a stunningly vivid 
account of the history of these three massive districts, along with an 
exposition of the mechanisms that support corruption, and the 
unfortunate trials of failed remedies.  However, the true brilliance 
of Segal’s work is not only her insightful theoretical analysis of why 
 
       †   Dennis J. Ciancio, Ph.D, is an Assistant Professor at the Center for 
Academic and Reading Skills, University of Texas Health Science Center at 
Houston.  Dr. Ciancio, a Developmental Psychologist, completed his doctorate at 
the University of Notre Dame in 2003.  His doctoral dissertation examined 
emotional and cognitive predictors of individual differences in Head Start 
children’s early literacy development.  He specializes in intervention evaluation, as 
well as children’s cognitive and socio-emotional development.  He has just been 
awarded a grant from the Institute for Educational Sciences to develop a 
vocabulary intervention for students at risk for academic failures.  Dr. Ciancio’s 
written work has been published in child development and educational journals. 
 1. LYDIA G. SEGAL, BATTLING CORRUPTION IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
(2005). 
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past reforms were unsuccessful, but also the inspired solutions she 
illustrates from successful reform efforts in other districts. 
Segal divides her analysis into five parts.  In Part I, “The 
Pathology: Laying the Record Bare,” she outlines the political and 
corporate nature of large school districts, citing numerous 
examples of corruption, waste, and abuse.  In Part II, “The 
Remedies Tried: The Frenzied Search for Accountability,” Segal 
describes the organizational structure and accountability 
mechanisms currently in place in those districts.  In Part III, “The 
Diagnosis: Getting to the Root Causes,” she sketches a theory of 
waste and fraud, itemizing the cost of waste, compartmentalization, 
managerial paralysis, and non-compliance oversight.  In Part IV, 
“The Wrong Medication: How Not to Fix the Problem,” Segal 
exposes the shortcomings of previous reform attempts.  Finally, in 
Part V, “The Prescription: How to Fix the Problem,” she outlines 
plausible remedies that have been successful in other large districts. 
PART I—THE PATHOLOGY 
Segal’s narrative begins with an introduction to the scope and 
pervasiveness of corruption within the three largest school districts 
in the United States.  She describes a number of severe problems, 
such as power brokering, patronage, and illicit dealings.  For her 
sources in this section, Segal relies almost exclusively on extensive 
journalistic and courtroom exposés of failures across the three 
districts.2  Such reliance on scandal and media-driven reports is 
necessary, as she points out, because of the covert nature of 
corruption.3  We typically become aware of corruption only after it 
has been exposed, and, frequently, even that exposure merely 
scratches the surface of the true problem.  This observation is not 
intended to discredit her work.  On the contrary, it underscores the 
limitations that constrain even the most extensive research into 
educational waste and fraud. 
Commendably, Segal also portrays the plight of the dedicated 
professionals who must circumvent unnecessary “red-tape” policies 
 
 2. For example, Segal devotes a section of this chapter to summarizing 
several murders and suicides involving contracts for school supplies.  Id. at 9-11.  
One of these is the murder of Dan Conlin, president of the New York City school 
custodians union, whose ideas, if implemented, would have caused private 
contractors to lose millions of dollars.  Id. at 9 (citing Eddie Dunne, Who Killed Dan 
Conlin?, BROOKLYN BRIDGE 2, NO. 10, 30-37 (1997)). 
 3. Id. at 35. 
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and procedures in an effort to effectively accomplish their jobs.  
The districts examined by Segal employ shameful bureaucratic 
policies for simple job functions.  School managers have been 
forced to find creative, sometimes illegal, mechanisms such as 
creating “credit pools” to be able to buy necessary school materials 
quickly.4  Not only are these procurement procedures—put in 
place to prevent fraud—ineffective at getting materials where 
needed, but these very policies contribute to the districts’ own 
wastefulness.  In a later chapter on the costs of oversight, Segal 
describes one example of the administrative cost of simple 
procurement policies in New York City.  In her example, the 
district’s extensive petty-cash reimbursement procedures, oversight 
checks, and review and approval processes created $500 in cost to 
process, approve and settle the request for a $4 battery pack!5  As 
Segal’s book shows, managers in these districts have little authority 
to accomplish their educational missions and some resort to 
alternate procedures to circumvent policy. 
Interestingly, Part I closes with a chapter on the effects of 
corruption on educational outcomes.  While it is easy to argue that 
corruption and abuse directly affect educational outcomes when 
money intended to support students’ education is “siphon[ed] . . . 
away before it ever reaches the classroom,”6 it is more difficult to 
demonstrate this empirically.  As Segal points out, “[i]t is very 
difficult to study corruption, waste, and abuse empirically.  
Corruption is by nature clandestine.”7  Segal does point to some 
mechanisms by which corruption affects educational outcomes, 
particularly diversion of funds away from classroom instruction, low 
quality hires, and low quality goods and services.8 
Segal correctly notes that the relationship between corruption 
and poor student performance cannot be assumed to be causal 
simply because a correlation exists between the two.9  
Unfortunately, despite this valid point, she then proceeds to infer 
that poor outcomes are indeed caused by corruption and waste 
anyway.  Segal’s exploration into this topic is unfortunately brief 
and the book would benefit from a more extensive examination of 
 
 4. Id. at 114. 
 5. Id. at 81-82. 
 6. Id. at 31. 
 7. Id. at 35. 
 8. Id. at 31-34. 
 9. Id. at 30. 
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whether the relationship between corruption and poor student 
performance are really causal, or merely correlated.  Her 
revelations of patronage, deal brokering, and coercion are most 
disturbing when they underscore the deleterious effects of 
corruption on student outcomes. 
Determining what affects student outcomes is the very essence 
of educational research.  Not surprisingly, the empirical evaluation 
of how corruption impacts student performance faces many of the 
same difficulties as, for example, evaluating the effects of 
curriculum efficacy, professional development, and remedial or 
preventative interventions on student performance.  One 
complexity faced by these researchers is choosing an appropriate 
methodology to adequately represent the mechanisms under study.  
Organizationally, students are nested within classrooms, classrooms 
within schools, schools within sub-districts, sub-districts within 
districts, etc.  Student performance may be, and often is, evaluated 
based on achievement test scores.  Often, it is the higher 
organizational levels—such as classroom, school, or sub-district—
that are meaningful in educational, sociological, or economical 
contexts.  Until only recently, researchers studying student 
outcomes struggled to appropriately capture the nested nature of 
the educational and/or social environments in which such 
outcomes exist.10  Consequently, methodological models that do 
not account for this nested structure risk faulty or distorted 
conclusions.  While formal empirical evaluation of corruption, 
waste, fraud, and abuse is beyond the scope of Segal’s book, 
descriptive illustration of their effects remains central to her aim 
and makes her book thought provoking by underscoring the 
potential for systematic empirical study. 
PARTS II AND III—ACCOUNTABILITY AND UNDERSTANDING 
THE ROOT CAUSES 
In Parts II and III of her book, Segal describes the school 
districts’ flawed accountability mechanisms and the costs of 
oversight.  At the heart of her description is the distinction between 
“compliance accountability” and “performance accountability.”11  
Compliance accountability attempts to guard against fraud by 
 
 10. See STEPHEN W. RAUDENBUSH & ANTHONY S. BRYK, HIERARCHICAL LINEAR 
MODELS: APPLICATIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS METHODS 4-5 (2d ed. 2002). 
 11. SEGAL, supra note 1, at 42. 
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laying out, to varying levels of detail, the operating procedures for 
employees to follow in order to carry out their jobs.  In the 
extreme, every job duty has a scripted procedure which must be 
strictly followed.  It is a top-down supervisory mechanism aimed at 
reducing the opportunities for fraud and waste.12  Conversely, 
performance accountability places the focus “on the quality of 
goods and services produced, not on the rules or procedures to 
produce them.”13 
What follows in Part III is a deft account of how increasing top-
down controls—like compliance accountability—in the three 
districts suffocates performance and actually leads to the very 
abuses the controls are designed to prevent.14  Segal demonstrates 
the plight of these large districts with numerous examples of 
corruption, waste, fraud, and abuse resulting from top-down 
controls.  She nicely interweaves the dense historical and 
organizational differences and similarities of these districts.  While 
acknowledging the differing, complex structure of these districts, 
she expertly ties the exemplified corruption into organizational 
structures and sociopolitical contexts by anecdotally illustrating 
various malfunctions across the three districts.15 
Segal also applies microeconomic theory to examine the 
effects organizational size has on school districts and, consequently, 
the optimal structure school districts can use.  The three largest 
school districts have a pyramidal organizational structure.  A 
pyramidal structure involves a specialized base of employees that 
pass information up to fewer and fewer managers with ultimate 
decision making authority.  For example, specialized units, such as 
custodial care, transportation, construction, and food services are 
separate units designed to coordinate delivery of each particular 
service across entire districts.  Citing the work of economist Oliver 
Williamson, Segal refers to this structure as “U-Form,” meaning 
“unitary-form.”16  Economists, such as Williamson, suggest that 
organizations with more than three-thousand employees, and with 
diverse and complicated missions, lose effectiveness within a U-
Form structure, because the top decision-making officials simply 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See generally id. at 63-116. 
 15. Id. at 65. 
 16. Id. at 66 (citing OLIVER WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS 
BEHAVIOR: AN INQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATION FORM ON ENTERPRISE 
BEHAVIOR (1970)). 
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are bombarded with too much complex information.17  Because 
many districts exceed the three-thousand-employee heuristic, one 
wonders whether the U-Form structure can be manageable in any 
reasonably large and diverse district.  What is less clear is whether 
the problems are inherent in the structure itself or peculiar to the 
very largest of large districts. 
PARTS IV AND V—WHAT TO (AND WHAT NOT TO) DO 
Segal emphasizes learning from past failed experiences to 
understand how not to approach educational reform.  For example, 
Segal states that corruption resists reform measures aimed at 
putting decision-making back into local political control.18  She 
cites the New York School Decentralization Law, enacted as a 
response to plunging reading scores and soaring drop-out rates.19  
Segal describes the tenuous lines drawn motivated by racial 
biases—which eventually gave rise to community-controlled 
schools.  The goal of community-controlled schools was to “force 
schools to be politically accountable to their communities and thus 
improve education for minorities.”20  The historical record 
indicates that this reform approach was largely unsuccessful at 
curbing waste.  Instead, it fostered a new level of the same 
corruption it was intended to prevent and even created a mafia-like 
mentality within certain districts.  As Segal reports, “[b]oard 
members who obtained jobs for people were known as their 
godfathers and godmothers.  The people for whom they obtained jobs 
were called their pieces.  Pieces earned their jobs through nepotism, 
sexual favors, and bribes but most commonly by doing political 
work for board members.”21 
To correct this problem, Segal outlines a plan for effective 
reform, which calls for the creation of an independent inspector 
general office to root out corrupt individuals and remove them 
from positions of power.  Following that recommendation, Segal 
again calls on microeconomic theory to recommend a different 
organizational structure for these massive districts.  Her suggestion 
is the multidivisional or M-Form structure.  Under an M-form 
structure “top officers delegate decision-making authority to the 
 
 17. Id. at 67. 
 18. Id. at 120. 
 19. Id. at 119-20; see generally N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590 (McKinney 2001). 
 20. SEGAL, supra  note 1, at 120. 
 21. Id. at 122. 
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managers in charge of each quasi-independent unit, who are held 
strictly accountable for their unit’s performance and audited for 
fiscal compliance.”22 
Interestingly, Segal’s application of microeconomic theory taps 
into another common thread of educational research, that of “size 
and scale.”  For example, imagine a principal implementing a 
community-based tutoring program in his or her school.  Over a 
few years this school demonstrates great success and becomes 
highly recognized.  Attributing the successes to the tutoring 
program, the district decides that it will implement a district-wide 
tutoring program.  The complexity of tasks such as coordinating 
tutor schedules, providing basic training for new tutors, recording 
student participation, tracking effectiveness, etc., grows 
exponentially and may quickly become unmanageable due to sheer 
size alone.  Such an implementation might fail simply due to size 
and being unprepared for the change in scale (i.e., from school-
sized to district-sized).  In fact, federal research opportunities are 
currently devoted to the particular topic of scaled-up 
implementation.  “The Interagency Education Research Initiative 
(IERI) is a federal partnership that includes the Department of 
Education’s Office of Educational Research and Improvement 
(OERI), the National Institute of Child Health and Human 
Development (NICHD), and the National Science Foundation 
(NSF).”23  “The specific programmatic goal of IERI” is to examine 
the issue of “scaling up” when implementing “educational 
interventions in reading, mathematics, and the sciences . . . in 
varied school settings with diverse student populations.”24 
In this section, Segal points out that in their strictest forms, 
compliance and performance accountability25 are incompatible, as 
a manager cannot “fairly be held responsible for quality of goods 
and services if he or she has no significant control over how they 
are delivered.”26  However, the M-Form organizational structure 
pushes decision making authority down to appropriate levels of 
expertise and creates performance-driven incentives for effective 
management and oversight.  This dovetails with current 
 
 22. Id. at 171 (citing WILLIAMSON, supra note 16). 
 23. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office of Educ. Research & Improvement, 
Interagency Education Research Initiative (IERI), 
http://www.ed.gov/offices/OERI/IERI/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
 26. SEGAL, supra  note 1, at 43. 
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recommendations from the scaling-up literature.  For example, one 
group of researchers has observed that a combination of top-down 
mandates—to standardize procedures and products—with locally 
influenced bottom-up mechanisms, is evident in successful scaled-
up research.27  In short, Segal’s application of organizational 
structure melds nicely with current empirical evidence on scaling 
issues. 
CONCLUSION 
In Battling Corruption in America’s Public Schools, Lydia Segal 
exposes waste, fraud, and abuse in the nation’s three largest school 
districts.  She systematically outlines the wasteful practices and 
ineffective accountability and oversight mechanisms that breed 
corruption.  Ironically, it is not the seedy tales of power brokering, 
nepotism, and patronage that are most striking.  Corruption and 
greed exist everywhere, and it is hardly shocking that there are 
individuals bent on bilking the system.  However, it is startling 
when the reader becomes aware of the vast amounts of waste and 
the endless bureaucratic procedures forming nearly-impassable 
obstacles for educators in these districts, preventing them from 
accomplishing their jobs. 
Segal’s analysis is both thorough and enjoyable, especially her 
method of weaving anecdotes from the three districts into the 
book’s colorful backdrop of corruption and waste.  While I believe 
her exploration into the effects of corruption on student outcomes 
is too brief, she does open the door for a more empirically rigorous 
examination of size and organizational structure on educational 
outcomes.  Further, the issues that are laid bare in Segal’s narrative 
also apply beyond the district level.  Federal programs and state 
mandates and controls can add additional layers of complexity that 
could also foster waste, abuse, or corruption.  Finally, Segal’s 
theoretical ties and proposed solutions, consistent with current 
educational research on scaling, have worked in other large district 
settings.  Battling Corruption in America’s Public Schools is a well 
researched glimpse into the provocative and disturbing side of 
public education and what can be done to clean it up. 
 
 27. J.M. Fletcher, B.R. Foorman, C.A. Denton & S. Vaughn, Scaling Research on 
Beginning Reading: Consensus and Conflict, in TRANSLATING EDUCATIONAL THEORY 
AND RESEARCH INTO PRACTICE (M. Constas & R. Sternberg eds.) (forthcoming 
2006). 
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